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Divergent thinking tests are often used in creativity research as measures of creative
potential. However, measurement approaches across studies vary to a great extent.
One facet of divergent thinking measurement that contributes strongly to differences
across studies is the scoring of participants’ responses. Most commonly, responses are
scored for fluency, flexibility, and originality. However, even with respect to only one
dimension (e.g., originality), scoring decisions vary extensively. In the current work, a
systematic framework for practical scoring decisions was developed. Scoring
dimensions, instructionscoring fit, adequacy of responses, objectivity (vs. subjectivity),
level of scoring (response vs. ideational pool level), and the method of aggregation were
identified as determining factors of divergent thinking test scoring. In addition,
recommendations and guidelines for making these decisions and reporting the
information in papers have been provided.
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While the field of creativity has managed to, for the most part, find agreement on
the definition of creativity, researchers in this field are less clear on how creativity
should be operationalized and measured. This issue has been at the forefront of
creativity research from its early days, starting with Guilford’s work on the structure of
intellect (Guilford, 1967). The measurement of creativity is a nontrivial matter (Plucker &
Renzulli, 1999), as reviews and previous research suggest that predictors or variables
associated with creativity may be specific to the measure used (Hornberg & ReiterPalmon, 2017; Plucker & Renzulli, 1999; Reiter-Palmon, Young Illies, Kobe Cross,
Buboltz, & Nimps, 2009), questioning the external validity of creativity studies. The work
of Guilford (1950) emphasized the study of creativity in everyday life and the importance
of divergent thought for creative production. Since then, divergent thinking (DT) tasks
have probably been the most often used measures in the field of creativity research
(Plucker, Qian, & Wang, 2011; Reiter-Palmon & Tinio, 2018).
However, there are limited resources available to researchers interested in the
various available scoring procedures of DT tests and lack of agreement on a uniform

way in which these scoring procedures should proceed (e.g., Plucker et al., 2011). In
this article, the operationalization of and the various specific scores that can be derived
from DT tests are discussed within a systematic framework to guide assessment
choices. Finally, we suggest practical guidelines for DT test scoring whenever possible.

The Nature of DT and DT Tasks
Despite the frequent use of tests designed to measure DT in creativity research,
they should not be conceived as measures of creativity per se (e.g., Guilford, 1966;
Runco, 2008). DT is the ability to generate multiple solutions in response to a given
stimulus or problem (Guilford, 1967), and therefore, DT tasks provide a measure of
(mainly) capacity for idea generation. Idea generation is only one process of the many
processes that make up the full creative process (e.g., Guilford, 1950; Reiter-Palmon,
2018). Thus, when DT is studied as one facet of the full creative process, we do so in
isolation of other important facets such as problem finding, idea evaluation, and so forth.
However, because idea generation is critical to creativity across domains, DT test
scores can be understood as indicators of potential, and they have been found to be
predictive of creative achievement (Guilford, 1966; Kim, 2008; Plucker, 1999; Runco,
Millar, Acar, & Cramond, 2010). It is important to keep in mind, therefore, that DT is not
a measure of the whole creativity phenomenon when planning a study or interpreting
findings.
Further, DT tasks cannot (and should not) be used interchangeably as if they
were a direct proxy of a general DT ability. Viewed from a purely psychometric
standpoint, DT tasks suffer from a poor alternate-form reliability, estimated to be on the
.30 –.40 range (e.g., Barbot, Besançon, & Lubart, 2016; see also Barbot, 2019). This
reliability depends on a number of factors such as the domain of the task, the time given
for resolution (greater individual differences appear with greater resolution time), prior
experience with or salience of stimuli used (Forthmann, Gerwig, Holling, Çelik, Storme,
& Lubart, 2016), or the nature of instructions (Harrington, 1975; Nusbaum, Silvia, &
Beaty, 2014). This raises two important issues: the importance of relying on a range of
DT tasks (rather than a single one) whenever possible and reporting accurately the
nature of DT tasks involved. For example, Guilford’s (1967) Structute of Intellect (SOI)based taxonomy, which has received empirical support (Guilford, 1984), could be used
to that end. Both of these issues must be addressed to avoid misinterpretation of
findings or overgeneralization to “general DT” if not the whole creativity phenomenon.

Scoring of DT Tasks
Researchers have many choices when it comes to DT scoring, and scoring
decisions have important bearing on the final scores they ultimately obtain and interpret
(for an overview of the scoring process, see Figure 1). In particular, one must consider
which DT response should enter the scoring process, which scoring dimension(s)
should be used, whether the chosen dimension(s) should be scored subjectively by
raters or by objective methods, and whether single responses should be scored and

then aggregated as opposed to scoring the ideational pool of each respondent. If using
the former, which approach to aggregation should be then used? If using the latter, how
should raters be instructed and what strategy should they use to mentally combine the
impression across all responses? Together, important decisions on the scoring process
should be made regarding six main issues: (1) dimension of DT to be scored, (2)
instructions provided to the participants and their fit to the chosen scoring dimension, (3)
adequacy of responses to be scored (or not), (4) method of scoring (“objective” vs.
“subjective”), (5) unit of scoring (response level vs. ideational pool), and (6) how should
scores be computed (e.g., method of aggregation of response-level scores).

Choosing the DT Dimensions to Be Scored
The main dimensions of DT outlined by Guilford (1967) refer to both the quantity
of ideas (fluency) and their quality, with respect to their diversity (flexibility), novelty
(originality), and degree of elaboration. However, current research on DT tends to focus
on fluency, followed by novelty and flexibility, with only a limited number of studies
looking at elaboration (Hornberg & ReiterPalmon, 2017). For this reason, and for the
sake of space saving, this article mainly focuses on fluency, flexibility, and originality.
Quantity of responses. A fluency score reflects the productivity aspect of DT.
This dimension is the most often used in DT research and most consensually
operationalized as a person’s number of answers provided, in response to a given DT
task. While some researches only count the number of adequate responses, some

include all responses, regardless of whether it actually addresses the prompt or task. In
this respect, this dimension of DT is the least ambiguous to score. However, based on
Guilford’s original conceptualization of the construct of ideational fluency (number of
ideas per unit of time, or “ideation rate”) and recurrent concerns regarding response
quality and fluency scores dependency, Barbot (2018) suggests that fluency may be
best operationalized as the time required to generate a determined number of
responses (e.g., how long does it take a test taker to generate 10 responses). This
alternative approach allows one to standardize the number of DT outputs produced by
each test taker, making comparisons of response quality more even. Regardless of its
operationalization, fluency is sometimes used as the sole indicator of DT production.
This approach has been criticized as the relationship between fluency and measures of
creative achievement or performance is relatively low (Plucker et al., 2011), and fluency
is not directly tied to the creativity definition of novelty and appropriateness. As a result,
we recommend that an indicator of response quality always be used in conjunction with
fluency.
Quality of responses. Originality is often reflected by the uncommonness,
remoteness, and cleverness of ideas, whereas flexibility reflects the variety of
responses (Guilford, 1967). Specifically, when evaluating responses for originality, the
focus is on how unusual or uncommon the responses are, which can be determined
using raterbased or frequency-based scoring methods. Both approaches along with
methods of aggregation of response-level originality scores will yield their unique sets of
challenges, such as fluency contamination effects (Plucker et al., 2011; see also below).
To evaluate flexibility, the number of different categories of responses has typically
been used. It has also been suggested that response quality can be assessed using a
broader perspective aligned with the definition of creativity, which includes, for example,
originality, appropriateness, or a combination of both (Forthmann, Holling, Çelik,
Storme, & Lubart, 2017; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2009; Runco & Charles, 1993; Runco,
Illies, & Reiter-Palmon, 2005). On this note, it is important to keep in mind that quality
scorings may have a somewhat different meaning when solutions for more realistic
problems are to be evaluated, indicating potential domain differences (Butler, Scherer,
& Reiter-Palmon, 2003; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2009).
A recent alternative definition provided by Simonton (2018) includes a surprise
component, which is tied to the prior knowledge of the person. Additionally, Simonton’s
definition provides a link to old/new scoring of responses (Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, &
Wynn, 2007). Old/new scoring instructs participants to classify their responses as “old” if
they had the idea before working on the task (the idea is just retrieved; see also Runco
& Acar, 2010) or “new” if they did not know the idea beforehand (the idea is generated
rather than retrieved). The focus on this dimension is appropriate when there is an
interest in memory processing underlying DT. This highlights the importance of
theoretically grounded decisions when it comes to choosing a given dimension of DT to
be scored, as opposed to reliance on mere conventions or ease of applicability.

Instruction-Scoring Fit
There is a large body of work on the effect of instructions on creative
performance in DT measures (cf. Harrington, 1975; Runco et al., 2005), and sensitivity
to slight variations of instructions has been critically appraised in studies on the
response set bias of DT measures (Lissitz & Willhoft, 1985). The specific dimension(s)
of DT of interest in a given study are optimally measured when instructions given are
conceptually aligned. The rationale behind instruction-scoring fit is transparency of the
task’s goal. Only when the task goal is clear to participants can true individual
differences in maximum performance with respect to the targeted dimension be
observed (Harrington, 1975; Nusbaum et al., 2014). For example, participants can be
assumed to propose responses that are creative, at least according to their own
standards and understanding of the construct, only if they are instructed to be creative
(Forthmann et al., 2016; Harrington, 1975; Nusbaum et al., 2014; Runco et al., 2005).
Accordingly, when participants are instructed to generate many ideas, fluency increases
and originality decreases. When participants are instructed to generate creative ideas,
originality increases and fluency decreases (Nusbaum et al., 2014).
For many research questions, using instruction scoring congruence is most
appropriate. Furthermore, when individual differences in fluency, flexibility, and
originality are of primary interest, instruction-congruent measurement of all dimensions
should be used. As a result, more tasks with corresponding congruent instructions are
needed, which extends overall testing duration and demands on test takers.
However, there can be exceptions. In some cases, semicongruent or hybrid
instructions (see Table 1 for an example) that emphasize multiple dimensions can be
used and have been found to increase creative performance (Butler et al., 2003).
Sternberg (2012) theorizes that creative individuals develop a need for uniqueness,
which manifests as a habit to be original. This implies that their originality should show
up in DT tasks even when they are not asked to do so. Thus, from this perspective,
incongruent originality can be the focus of a study.

Adequacy of Responses
DT tests are often scored after manual exclusion of inadequate responses
defined according to several criteria. For example, the test manual from Guilford’s
Alternate Uses Test (Wilson, Christensen, Merrifield, & Guilford, 1960) provides strict
guidelines with respect to what qualifies as adequate response. Prescriptions preclude
responses that apply to any object such as selling, borrowing, and the like. In addition,
lists of common uses are provided to facilitate exclusion of such responses. However,
nowadays, such ideas may remain in the response sample and be used in scoring
(Abraham, 2016). Very often only incomplete, nonunderstandable, or nonsensical ideas
and repetitions are excluded prior to scoring (see Forthmann et al., 2016). We suggest
that criteria used to define response adequacy should be reported (even if responses
were not evaluated for adequacy), and those criteria should be selected in line of the

purpose of the study. It is important to note that there is some overlap between the
adequacy of the response and appropriateness (which is sometimes rated), such that
those responses that are not adequate are also not appropriate. However, adequate
responses can still have varying degrees of appropriateness.

Method of Scoring
After deciding which dimension to score in light of the corresponding DT task
instructions chosen, scoring may rely on either or both rater-based (i.e., often coined
“subjective” methods) and empirically based methods (often coined “objective”
methods). Obviously, objectivity is a desirable property of a measure (see Runco,
2008), but empirically based scorings of DT dimensions have their problems and, thus,
rater-based scorings remain a useful option.
Empirically based scoring. Empirically based scoring of originality is usually
based on the statistical frequencies of each response in the study sample, tapping into
response uncommonness (Forthmann, Holling, Çelik, et al., 2017; Mouchiroud & Lubart,
2001). However, it is generally overlooked that the process of building the response
occurrence table to calculate response frequencies often involves subjective decisions
as to whether responses are actually the same as or different from each other (which is
also a recurrent issue in flexibility scoring). Therefore, it is important to identify
equivalent responses, and it has been acknowledged in the literature that this can be
troublesome at times (Runco & Mraz, 1992). A best practice in this regard would be to
base similarity evaluations on feature overlap (Maki, Krimsky, & Muñoz, 2006). Maki et
al. (2006) demonstrated that feature overlap can be rated accurately, as suggested by
early DT research using frequency tabulation of DT responses (Cropley, 1972).
However, it is further important to take into account that some feature differences might

be irrelevant. For example, Wilson et al. (1960) outline that “saying that a milk carton
can be used to ‘hold orange juice’ is not sufficiently different form ‘used to hold milk’” (p.
4). Thus, it is recommended to focus on feature differences resulting in functional
differences for Alternative Uses Tasks (AUT) (or, depending on the task, on other
aspects of similarity). Overall, it is surprising that the issue of how to judge response
similarity in cross-tabulations for frequency-based originality scoring has rarely been
described in detail and studied in the literature.
Another important consideration relates to what is considered an original
response. Researchers have used continuous frequency-based scores (Forthmann,
Holling, Çelik, et al., 2017; Mouchiroud & Lubart, 2001) or different thresholds to identify
uncommon responses such as idiosyncratic responses, or those responses given by
less than 1%, 5%, 10%, or even 20% of the study sample (Plucker, Qian, &
Schmalensee, 2014). However, frequency estimates for scoring responses as
“uncommon” or not are more accurate with larger sample sizes (see the online
supplemental material). Confidence intervals around those frequency estimates are
narrower (i.e., estimates more precise) for a larger sample than for a smaller sample,
regardless of the threshold used.1 Moreover, following the call for instructionscoring fit, it
is possible that rather common responses are less frequently proposed than normal
with explicit instructions to be creative and, paradoxically, may artificially appear to be
more original (Forthmann, Holling, Çelik, et al., 2017). It is therefore recommended that
empirically based scoring be used only when the sample size is sufficiently large (for
more elaborate considerations with respect to this issue, see the online supplemental
material).
Flexibility is commonly scored according to preexisting categories or a category
system constructed ad hoc based on given data. Interscorer reliability in this context
tends to be high, although objectivity is lower as compared to fluency scoring. One
approach for scoring flexibility is counting the total number of different categories that
have been utilized. A variant of this scoring is the number of category switches
(Guilford, 1967; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). With its focus on category transitions instead
of category assignment, this variant is a useful alternative, in particular for idea
generation process studies.2
1 As such, using an increased threshold value to determine response uncommonness, as has been
suggested, will not compensate for the imprecision related to sample size. For example, a unique
response in a sample of 50 participants would yield a frequency estimate of 2% (one-sided ClopperPearson 95% CI [0.0, 9.1]). A response that occurs four times in a sample of 200 participants also yields
a 2% frequency estimate (95% CI [0.0, 4.5]). While both scenarios result in a 2% estimate, corresponding
CIs suggest that it can be used with confidence within the larger sample (the response likely not exceeds
a 5% threshold for scoring originality; i.e., the CI does not cover the 5% threshold) and with reservation
within the small sample (5% threshold is covered by the CI). See also online supplemental Figure S1.
2In this review, we are not referring to empirically based scoring methods relying on latent semantic
analysis and related approaches. These are discussed in greater length in Acar and Runco (2019).

Rater-based scoring. Another approach to score for uncommonness involves
human raters with sufficient experience with the response pool for the task at hand who
judge on a Likert-type scale.3 Gaining the required experience may involve self-guided
familiarization with the generated responses or rater training prior to the final ratings, as
well as familiarity with the creativity literature. The other two indicators of originality,
remoteness and cleverness, can be scored in a similar fashion. When remoteness is
assessed using rater-based scoring, only some facets of remoteness might be relevant
for rater instructions (e.g., feature overlap vs. part-whole relations). For example, for the
AUT, rating instructions might be mainly concerned with functional relations. Moreover,
cleverness as an indicator of originality is solely scorable using rater-based methods
emphasizing imaginativeness, ingenuity, funniness, and cunning aptness of responses
(i.e., the defining terms of cleverness in creativity research). Examples of various rating
scales used in scoring of DT tests are available in much of the research (Forthmann,
Holling, Çelik, et al., 2017; Reiter-Palmon et al., 2009; Runco et al., 2005; Silvia et al.,
2008).
In recent years, rater-based scorings have frequently used a combination of all
three originality indicators: uncommonness, remoteness, and cleverness (Forthmann,
Holling, Zandi, et al., 2017; Silvia et al., 2008). Indeed, Forthmann, Holling, Çelik, et al.
(2017) found convergent validity evidence of several originality indicators, with only
latent semantic analysis– based remoteness converging to a lesser extent with other
scores. Furthermore, it should be noted that the combined rating scheme outlined in
Silvia et al. (2008) may implicitly include the second component of creativity (i.e.,
appropriateness). That is, fuzzy, random, or vague ideas are set to receive low scores.
Relatedly, it is also possible to provide subjective ratings of appropriateness or
usefulness for DT responses (e.g., Reiter-Palmon et al., 2009; Runco et al., 2005).
Thus, with scorings for both facets of the standard definition of creativity, the conceptual
connection of scoring and creativity would be highest. Further, combined ratings of both
components have also been used for overall creativity ratings (Mouchiroud & Lubart,
2001). Finally, it should be noted that flexibility of ideational pools could rely on raterbased scoring using a Likert-type scale (ranging, e.g., from 1 not flexible at all to 5 very
flexible), and the use of subjectively derived categories by the test takers themselves
has been suggested (Snyder, Mitchell, Bossomaier, & Pallier, 2004).

Scoring of Individual Responses Versus Scoring of Ideational Pools
Scoring of the various dimensions of DT involves either considerations of
individual responses or of the whole ideational pool. For instance, flexibility can only be
scored in consideration of all responses provided by an individual, whereas originality of
DT production can be scored at response level or at ideational pool level. Hence,
3 For discussion on specific practice and recommendations of procedure here, we refer the reader to the
review on the consensual assessment technique by Cseh and Jeffries (2019).

decisions with respect to whether responses should be scored as a whole set or
individually should be made, leading to follow-up decisions about how to aggregate
response-level information.
Fluency scores are derived after scrutinizing each response’s adequacy
(Torrance, 1966; Wilson et al., 1960). In addition, flexibility or category switch scores
require each response to be assigned into a conceptual category or to be marked as a
conceptual switch or nonswitch as compared to the previously generated response (see
Guilford, 1967). As suggested above, a subjective flexibility score could also be rated
for full ideational pools. For originality, the question whether each response as opposed
to the full ideational pool should be scored is naturally dependent on the choice
between empirically based or rater-based scoring (see Figure 1).
With empirically based scorings, such as frequency-based originality, it is
straightforward to score single responses prior to aggregation or statistical analyses,
whereas for rater-based scorings, each ideational pool could also be scored as a whole
(“snapshot scoring”; Forthmann, Holling, Zandi, et al., 2017; Plucker et al., 2014;
Plucker et al., 2011; Runco & Mraz, 1992). While ideational pool scoring comes with the
disadvantage that it prevents the response level to be the focus of analysis, it also
reduces the overall burden on raters in terms of the number of ratings required.
However, while ideational pool scoring reduces the overall number of ratings,
each single judgment is much more complex in terms of information processing.
Forthmann, Holling, Zandi, et al. (2017) showed that this higher level of complexity is a
likely source of rater disagreement and provide directions to reduce this complexity.
Hass, Rivera, and Silvia (2018) found lower levels of reliability for ideational pool
scoring compared to single idea ratings when laypersons were instructed to rate AUT
and Consequences Task responses.
Finally, Silvia et al. (2008) introduced the notion of top-scoring. In this approach,
participants select their top responses (most often two are chosen), those they believe
are most creative, and only those are then rated. This, of course, reduces the amount of
work associated with ratings. However, resulting scores reflect more complex thinking
processes than just original idea generation, as it also supposes that test takers know to
accurately select original responses (idea selection), which is not always the case
(ReiterPalmon et al., 2009). In addition, researchers have also been concerned about
the loss of information associated with the Top 2 scoring approach (e.g., Forthmann,
Szardenings, & Holling, 2018). As only two ideas are scored for each individual, all the
rest of the ideas are not scored or used.4
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising that additional concern regarding the Top 2 scoring
approach.

Aggregating Scored Responses
For fluency, aggregation is typically made by the summation of all adequate
responses. For flexibility, the aggregated score results as the number of different
assigned conceptual categories for a person’s idea set. For category switching as a
measure of flexibility, there are two scoring options. First, all switches are counted as
one and then are summed (Guilford, 1967). The second approach counts switching only
if the category has not been used before (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). However, any
summation of weighted responses results in a confounding effect of flexibility scores by
fluency (Forthmann, Szardenings, et al., 2018; Silvia et al., 2008). For correlational
studies, these flexibility variants are best divided by fluency or, alternatively, residual
scores can be used (Runco & Albert, 1985). However, for a study with a focus on mean
comparison, flexibility scores based on summation can be meaningful (e.g., Forthmann,
Regehr, et al., 2018).
The confounding effect of fluency in originality scores is often discussed
(Forthmann, Szardenings, et al., 2018; Plucker et al., 2014; Plucker et al., 2011; Silvia
et al., 2008). Forthmann, Szardenings, et al. (2018) provided a precise technical
treatment of artifactual quality– quantity correlations, concluding that, for correlational
studies, calculating ratio quality scores (whether originality, uncommonness, or another
dimension) must be the default choice. Another reasonable alternative to ratio scores
are residual scores (Runco & Albert, 1985), although this scoring potentially removes
meaningful variation in originality beyond the artifactual overlap with fluency
(Forthmann, Szardenings, et al., 2018). However, both average and residual scores
potentially suffer from low reliability, which notably vary according to the correlation
between fluency and the summative quality score (Arndt, Cohen, Alliger, Swayze, &
Andreasen, 1991; Forthmann, Szardenings, et al., 2018). Overall, we have to admit that
decisions here are heavily complex and affected by factors that cannot always be
anticipated (e.g., the correlation between fluency and summative originality, which
varies from study to study and heavily affects the reliability of ratios/average scores).
For a more detailed treatment of issues around the effects of fluency contamination and
potential solutions (e.g., ratio or residual scores), the reader should consult the above
cited works. An illustration of possibilities to aggregate initially weighted ideas according
to various scorings (beyond those mentioned above) can be found in online
supplemental Table S1.

Practical Recommendations
Based on the discussion presented above, the following recommendations and
guidelines are provided for decisions prior to data collection (design and methodology)
and after data collection (scoring).

Prior to Data Collection

Prior to data collection, while designing the study, researchers should be careful
to consider a number of issues. First is the type of DT task used. Depending on the
purpose of the study, you may want to choose a specific domain and acknowledge that
the task is not representative of all domains. However, if the purpose is to evaluate DT
in general, then multiple domains and tasks must be included. Further, researchers
must be careful here, as even within a domain, task types are not homogeneous
(Reiter-Palmon et al., 2009). In addition, the dimensions on which DT scoring will be
evaluated must also be considered at this point. This choice must be guided by the
research questions posed and needs to occur early in the process, as it will influence
the instructions given to participants. Specifically, depending on the purpose of the
study and dimensions of interest, instruction-scoring congruence or hybrid instructions
should be considered. As noted, in most cases, congruence would be a more
appropriate choice. Importantly, if multiple dimensions of DT to be scored (e.g., fluency
and originality) are to be used, and if congruent scoring is important, researchers may
want to have separate tasks and instructions for fluency and separate ones for
originality. This can quickly result in an increased number of tasks that the participant
needs to engage in. Regardless of the final decision made by the researchers, DT
studies should include information on the nature of the tasks (in that respect, we
recommend using a SOI-based taxonomy) and the specific instructions that were used.

After Data Collection
Once the data have been collected, researchers must make decisions about
scoring DT. The first issue is that of using response-level or response-set-level scoring,
which will often be guided by prior decisions on dimensions of DT to be scored and
other considerations such as sample size, availability of raters, and specific research
questions. One important issue that emerges from using response-level scoring or
scoring multiple dimensions of DT is the amount of work associated with such scoring. It
is sometimes the reason that researchers choose to score fluency only, which is less
ambiguous to score, and can be obtained quickly and easily. However, there are a
number of ways that would allow researchers to obtain response-level quality scoring in
a more efficient way (although this still takes time!).
By categorizing the responses first, researchers may be able to obtain responselevel scoring more easily. As most research uses rater-derived categories, this is the
process we will discuss. Two (or more) raters (blind to study conditions, if any) should
review the full list of ideas, which would be presented in a random order. Each rater will
then create a list of categories, with sample responses. At this point, one important
consideration is the breadth of the categories. Broad categories will yield very few
categories overall, whereas narrow categories will yield too many categories with very
few responses— both of which will influence the flexibility score. The two raters should
discuss and compare categories. Once each rater has created a list of categories, the
raters will meet to compare and discuss categories to create a final list of categories.
Once the list of categories is finalized, two raters will categorize the responses and

resolve any categorization differences. It is important that the category list and interrater
agreement on categories (prior to discussion) be included when reporting results. Some
practical issues to consider at this point: It is easiest to use an Excel spreadsheet for all
of this work and note the category by each response. Second, a miscellaneous category
should be created, and any response that cannot be categorized should be placed in
this category. At that point, the responses in the miscellaneous category should be
evaluated to determine if a new category has emerged.
Empirically based scoring includes scores on fluency, flexibility, and originality.
Fluency is typically a direct count of ideas for each person. Here a decision needs to be
made regarding whether ideas are redundant or not, as only nonredundant ideas are
counted. More important, depending on the task and other scores, researchers may
choose to count only relevant ideas, that is, those that fulfill the task requirements (as
defined by the chosen response adequacy criteria, which must be precisely reported).
However, if the dimensions include aspects of adequacy as part of the dimension
definition (e.g., appropriateness), researchers may choose to still include these ideas
but score them lower on that dimension. Flexibility scores can be obtained by summing
the total number of different categories used or by evaluating switching as outlined
above. The way in which a flexibility score was determined must be reported in the
article. For empirically based originality scoring, the use of categories is particularly
helpful. Similar responses will be placed in the same category, so it allows the
researcher to view more easily how many of the same responses were provided in the
data set and calculate a percent for each response.
Rater-based scoring for response-level data is also easier when responses are
evaluated within a category. Raters can then provide the same rating more easily to the
same response, as similar responses are grouped together. Although this is the
dominant approach in rater-based scoring of originality, it is likely that it results in scores
biased toward uncommonness. Indeed, raters may be implicitly influenced by the
occurrence of identical responses in the pool of response they are judging. Therefore,
an alternative procedure is to present raters with a “catalogue” of responses with all
different responses in the sample presented only once, masking the occurrence of each
response to the raters. The catalogue is then scored independently, and scores
provided by each rater are matched back at the response level.
The final result here is a database that includes information at the response level
for each participant. While fluency and flexibility yield one score per participant, the
scoring for originality or other dimension, whether objective or subjective, results in
multiple scores per participant and therefore should be aggregated, which was
discussed in the previous section.

Discussion
The aim of the present review on DT scoring practices was to identify the major
decisions related to scoring that researchers must engage in. We have identified

several facets of the scoring process, beginning with choice of scoring dimensions,
scoring method (empirically based vs. rater based), level of scoring (idea vs. ideational
pool level), and the method of aggregation, as critical decision points. We have further
outlined several practical considerations with respect to determining adequacy and
similarity of responses, which affects later steps of scoring procedures. In addition, we
have provided practical recommendations whenever possible and identified gaps in the
literature indicating the need for future research. These methodological differences may
also account for some of the differences identified in the results of the many studies that
use DT. However, our review indicates that different goals in research require different
choices for scoring. Thus, it is expected that methodological setups in DT studies will to
some degree remain different, but the outlined framework calls for a stronger theoretical
justification with respect to measurement choices, which will strengthen future research.
As a final note, the outlined systematic framework will also facilitate studies on
the robustness of findings in relation to DT. For example, the correlation between
openness to experience with DT can be considered a benchmark finding because it was
reported for several of the different choices outlined in this work. We argue that variety
in DT assessment approaches should be used to reveal further benchmark findings,
which are very useful when it comes to comparisons of competitive theories or the
examination of new research topics related to DT.
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